Category Archives: Philosophy

Reuben Hersh, 1927-2020 (with text)

Here is the introduction to my article Do Mathematicians Have Responsibilities, published in Humanizing mathematics and its philosophy.Essays celebrating the 90th birthday of Reuben Hersh.Edited by Bharath Sriraman. Birkhäuser/Springer, Cham (2017) 115-123.

I have been an admirer of Reuben Hersh ever since I received a copy of The Mathematical Experience, then brand new, as a birthday present.  At that stage, of course, I was admiring the tandem Reuben formed then, and on other occasions, with his co-author Philip J. Davis.  It was only almost 20 years later, after I started reading What is Mathematics, Really? that I could focus my admiration on Reuben — and not only on the mathematician, the author, the thinker about mathematics, but on the person Reuben Hersh — the unmistakable and unforgettable voice that accompanies the reader from the beginning to the end of the book.  So unforgettable was the voice, in fact, that when Reuben, wrote to me out of the blue three years ago to ask me what I thought about a certain French philosopher, I so clearly heard the voice of the narrator of What is Mathematics, Really? (and no doubt of many of the passages of his books with Davis) that I could honestly write back that I felt like I had known him for decades, though we have never met and until that time we had never exchanged a single word.

The voice in question is the voice of an author who is struggling to put words on an intense and intensely felt experience, who has intimate knowledge of how it feels to be a mathematician and also a knowledge no less intimate of the inadequacy of the language of our philosophical tradition to do justice to that experience, so that all attempts to do so inevitably end in failure; but this knowledge is compensated by the conviction that the stakes are so important that we can’t choose not to try.   What makes Reuben’s authorial voice compelling is that it sounds just as we expect the voice of a person in the middle of that struggle must sound.[1]   It’s the strength of this conviction that comes across in Reuben’s writing, so that reading his books and essays is remembered (by me, at least) as a conversation, a very lively conversation, filled with the passionate sense that we are talking about something that matters.  Also filled with disagreements — because I don’t always agree with everything I read in Reuben’s books and essays; beyond questions of detail the difference might come down to my sense that Reuben is trying to get to the bottom of the mathematical experience, whereas I apprehend the experience as bottomless; or I might say that it’s the effort to get to its bottom that is at the bottom of the experience.  But the differences are of little moment; what stays with me after reading a few pages of Reuben’s writing is the wholeness of the human being reflected in his words, a human being who cares so deeply about his mathematical calling that he is ready to add his own heroic failure to the long list of admirable failures by the most eminent philosophers of the western tradition to account for mathematics; and without these inevitable failures we would not begin to understand why it does matter to us.

[1] As I wrote that sentence I remembered that I have still not met Reuben, nor have I ever spoken to him; but I checked one of the videos online in which he appears and, sure enough, his literal voice is very much as I expected.

The soul of a space

The paper Česnavičius and Scholze just posted on arXiv answers several longstanding open questions in fundamental algebraic geometry.  It also introduces a new definition with energetic new terminology:

anima

I don’t pretend to know which of the authors had the idea of returning to Latin roots in order to find the appropriate word to designate the objects that Lurie had chosen to call “spaces,” as well as their cognates in other settings.  Scholze’s terminological innovations have been more than commonly successful up to now, but I predict that “animated sets” will be especially popular.  A whole thesis in philosophy of mathematics — and a second thesis in theology of mathematics? — could be devoted to the last sentence above.

It turns out that the expression “soul of a space” has been popular for some time among interior designers and architects.

Bakliwala

A room designed by architect Vipin Bakliwala

Bakliwala’s reply also deserves our attention:

As architects, it is our duty to induce emotions into a space and create an ambience that brings forth our hidden calm, positive and spiritual side. We strive to expand the brief given by the client and create a space that elevates and improves his life. We struggle to provide an environment which is an enhanced reflection of his thoughts. We call such places soul shelters.  It is that space where the soul remains in its innate nature.

Do emotions inhere more spontaneously in “worldly” point-set “physical” topological spaces or in their animated “calm, positive, and spiritual” ghostly doubles?  Descartes and Spinoza might help us sort this out.

 

UPDATE:  T.G. pointed out that, if I had read past the introduction to the acknowledgments, I would have realized that

The terminology is due to Clausen, inspired by Beilinson; see the acknowledgements, and the first paragraph of section 5.1.

Here is a passage from Beilinson’s article Topological E-factors that sheds some light on his perception of the need for appropriate terminology, and about the desolation of ordinary category theory.

Beilinson

A. A. Beilinson, Topological E-factors, Pure and Applied Mathematics Quarterly 3, 357-391, (2007)

Beilinson, or my imagined recollection of him, expresses a rather different opinion of spaces on p. 202 of MWA.

Roundtable video, incorrect proofs, true theorems

The Helix Center has now posted the video of Saturday’s round table on “Mechanization of Mathematics”.  The discussion was lively and everyone agreed that we should meet again, or even that we should organize a conference on the theme.

Since concern about correctness of proofs is one of the primary motivations of mathematicians who are active in automated proof verification, it was interesting to hear several colleagues at the IAS quote the following remark about Solomon Lefschetz:

He had marvelous intuition, and so far as I know, all of the results he claimed in algebraic geometry have now been proved. When I was a graduate student at Princeton, it was frequently said that “Lefschetz never stated a false theorem nor gave a correct proof.”

This is Philip Griffiths reminiscing, in his contribution to the biographical memoirs of Lefschetz (on p. 289).  The Helix Center discussion did raise the question of mechanizing mathematical intuition, but didn’t reach any conclusions.  The mathematicians I know would prefer to have correct proofs of correct theorems, but if our choice were between mechanical generators of false proofs of false theorems and false proofs of true theorems I guess we would pick the latter — especially if they were as consequential as the hard Lefschetz theorem.

And indeed, I was surprised to learn — but perhaps I should not have been — that Griffiths’s description of Lefschetz fits quite of few of the mathematicians I have most admired (I won’t name names).

Several people I admire were in the audience and others were watching the livestream.  Kevin Buzzard congratulated me for finding a way to quote William Burroughs (at 53′).  I repeat the quotation for the reader’s convenience:

[The] junk merchant does not sell his product to the consumer, he sells the consumer to his product. He does not improve and simplify his merchandise. He degrades and simplifies the client.

—William Burroughs, Naked Lunch

UPDATE:  A point I was trying to make at the roundtable, and also in the middle of this article, and in this post, about the inevitability of mechanization of mathematics (and of everything else, and of the monetization of the resulting data by tech companies), is made much more clearly and forcefully by Rose Eveleth in an article published today on Vox.

 

Roundtable on Mechanization of Mathematics

From the announcement:

Proof, in the form of step by step deduction, following the rules of logical reasoning, is the ultimate test of validity in mathematics. Some proofs, however, are so long or complex, or both, that they cannot be checked for errors by human experts. In response, a small but growing community of mathematicians, collaborating with computer scientists, have designed systems that allow proofs to be verified by machine. The success in certifying proofs of some prestigious theorems has led some mathematicians to propose a complete rethinking of the profession, requiring future proofs to be written in computer readable code. A few mathematicians have gone so far as to predict that artificial intelligence will replace humans in mathematical research, as in so many other activities.

One’s position on the possible future mechanization of proof is a function of one’s view of mathematics itself. Is it a means to an end that can be achieved as well, or better, by a competent machine as by a human being? If so, what is that end, and why are machines seen as more reliable than humans? Or is mathematics rather an end in itself, a human practice that is pursued for its intrinsic value? If so, what could that value be, and can it ever be shared with machines?

With Stephanie Dick, Brendan Fitelson, Thomas Hales, Michael Harris (who will largely follow the script already presented here), and Francesca Rossi.  At the Helix Center, 247 East 82nd St.

Mathematics, music, philosophy, and Alain Badiou

IRCAM - 1

Panel at IRCAM, June 7, 2019.  Left to right:  François Nicolas, Yves André, Fernando Zalamea.  Alain Badiou is seated in the audience on the left.

To celebrate the publication of the third and final volume of Alain Badiou’s Being and Event trilogy, the organizers of the Paris MAMUPHI seminar — MAthématiques, MUsique, PHIlosophie — devoted a two-day conference at IRCAM (Institut de Recherche et Coordination Acoustique/Musique), under the title L’hypothèse du contemporain.

For the 20th anniversary of the Mamuphi seminar (mathematics-music-philosophy), these encounters are dedicated to L’Immanence des vérités, the latest work by the philosopher Alain Badiou, and, more particularly, to his theory of “works-in-truth”. How are works distinguished from “waste” and, incidentally, “archives”? The final part of the work by Badiou formalizes a limitless alternative to the oppression of finality. These days in June gather together mathematicians, musicians, philosophers, and the author to formulate their own hypothesis in the shadow of their reading of the contemporary in the 21st century.

Yves André invited me as one of the mathematicians, and because of my deep respect for André’s writings about mathematics — and of course for his mathematical work — I was pleased to accept the invitation.

Badiou’s three-volume system is heavily based on set theory and much of the third volume is devoted to the theory of large cardinals, with chapters on ultrafilters, theorems of Scott, Jensen, and Kunen, 0#, and much more.  I have no idea what the upcoming Columbia graduate workshop will make of all this.  My own presentation had nothing to do with set theory; my aim was to explain why Badiou was wrong to hint in his book, in passing, that the mathematics of Andrew Wiles belonged with the “waste,” or at best the “archives.”  You can watch my talk or you can read it (preceded by a couple of pages explaining my misgivings about the theme of the conference).

I have to confess a less highbrow motivation, though.  Here is an excerpt from a review by Stanley Chang of Mathematics without Apologies that appeared in Society, dated June 25, 2018.

Other reviewers, both academics and nonacademics, have quite forcefully deprecated his use of ideas without context, the irrelevancy of various sections, an unreadably poor organization, and a purposely opaque stream-of-consciousness that prohibits understand [sic] rather than encourages it. One of my own friends, an anthropologist in academia, laughingly said that his treatment of Badiou is something that you would expect from a bad first-year philosophy essay from a bad student at a bad university.

Although Chang gave excellent reasons for his evident dislike of the book, he went out of his way to give it a fair reading, and I have no problem with his review.  But why did he make up this part about Badiou?  MWA contains no “treatment of Badiou.”  According to the index, Badiou’s name appears three times, and only in endnotes.  Two of the references are direct quotations, without anything that can be construed as a “treatment,” and the third quotes Juliet Flower MacCannell’s comments on a quotation by Badiou regarding Lacan’s theory of love, along with Vladimir Tasić’s gloss on the quotation and the comments.

In the Q&A following my talk in Paris I got a laugh from Badiou by suggesting that the mere mention of his name would provoke the laughter of many American philosophers, not to mention anthropologists.  But I don’t think that explains Chang’s sentence.  Maybe he was confusing Badiou with Bourdieu?  Or maybe the treatment in question was on this blog, for example here?

I would fault the editors of Society for allowing the publication of that last sentence, or any sentence, on any subject whatsoever, that quotes an anonymous anthropologist — laughing no less — for the sole purpose of taking a cheap shot.  But in fact I have no idea what the sentence is about.